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Abstract: History and boundaries are the foundations of international economic law (IEL) as a 
professional and intellectual field. History is often told to support a wide variety of present 
projects, norms and ideas by appealing to the past. Boundary is a technique frequently used to 
map and defend an exclusive domain for applying the IEL expertise to a broad range of 
programmes, rules and theories. This article first describes how history and boundaries interact 
to produce a ‘traditional’ view of IEL’s past and present place in the world economy. This 
interaction plays a central role in structuring how international lawyers assert the authority and 
legitimacy of IEL in global economic governance. It then argues that the commitments of the 
traditional approach to Anglocentrism and Modernism limit lawyers’ ability to understand and 
solve the present-day issues, since it produces lessons only in support of the dominant 
programmes, norms and ideas under contestation. Consequently, it constrains, instead of 
empowers, lawyers’ imagination. Building on this critique, the article outlines an alternative 
approach devised to rethink the IEL field and, more importantly, which past or new projects, 
norms and theories do or do not count (or should or should not count) as part of it. It 
concludes with reflections on how we might go about reimagining IEL in response to the 
contemporary challenges to global economic governance.  
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I.INTRODUCTION 
 
The field of international economic law (IEL) holds in high esteem its own history 
and boundaries. From its founding fathers to today’s highly specialised lawyers, 
debates about the origins and evolution, autonomy and frontiers of IEL have been 
an essential part of the discipline. Yet, both – history and boundaries – seem to be 
experienced as unrelated, or perhaps contrasting, modes of disciplinary 
governance situated on opposite sides of the IEL expertise.   
 On the one hand, history tends to trigger lawyers’ imagination of IEL as a 
disciplinary technique that governs the movement of meanings across time. 
Historical narratives are regarded as a way of providing support to a wide variety 
of IEL projects, norms, institutions, theories and methods by connecting their 
past to the present. On the other hand, boundaries tend to cause lawyers to think 
of IEL as a disciplinary technique that controls the movement of meanings across 
space. Demarcation is considered a way to vindicate the existence of a(n) 
(exclusive) domain for the application of IEL expertise to a broad range of 
programmes, rules, regimes, theories and methods, by distinguishing it from the 
others. 
 The purpose of this article is to describe, criticise and offer an alternative to 
the disciplinary consensus around the interaction between the history and 
boundaries of international economic law. By examining this interplay, I intend to 
rethink the ways in which lawyers have approached and dealt with foundational 
and present-day questions about global economic law and governance. More 
specifically, I question what a study of the history and boundaries can tell us today 
about the current limitations of IEL expertise and the possibilities it provides to 
reform or transform itself and the contemporary international economic order. 
Hence, my ultimate goal is to invite the IEL field to reflect upon the self-imposed 
disciplinary restraints and their political and intellectual consequences. 
 The argument unfolds in three parts. Section II presents and analyses the 
traditional approach to the history of international economic law. It focuses 
particularly on the ways in which lessons are drawn from this history in order to 
inform legal expertise. Section III discusses the limits of the traditional approach 
by suggesting that the conventional commitment to Modernism and 
Anglocentrism tends to obfuscate the instrumentalisation of past events to 
support or exclude present projects, rules, regimes, theories and techniques. The 
ultimate consequence is to adversely affect lawyers’ ability to respond to the 
current problems faced by global economic governance. Building on this critique, 
section IV proposes to rethink how history and boundaries relate to one another 
by offering an alternative approach. The aspiration is to empower international 
lawyers with ways to reimagine the IEL field and, more importantly, reconsider 
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which past or present projects, norms and theories do or do not count (or should 
or should not count) as part of it. 
 In the Conclusion, the article returns to the central issues involving the 
interplay between history and boundaries inside and outside of the field of 
international economic law. From an external viewpoint, it argues that the 
disciplinary boundaries have done a great deal of work in preventing international 
lawyers from offering satisfactory solutions to the contemporary challenges facing 
global economic governance. From an internal perspective, it asserts that the 
field’s boundaries result from the interaction between intellectual debates 
meaningfully grounded in history lessons and the political disputes arising out of 
collective and individual pursuits of authority and legitimacy. Therefore, to break 
up the imaginative gridlock on the IEL expertise, the solution advocated by the 
article is to move away from the traditional approach and towards to the 
alternative approach. 
 
 
II. FROM THE PRESENT TO THE PAST, THE TRADITIONAL 
APPROACH TO THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
LAW 
 
The purpose of this section is to depict the traditional approach to the history of 
international economic law from the scholarly literature. The analysis suggests that 
the traditional approach is widely employed to construct history lessons, which, in 
turn, play a fundamental role in influencing the ways lawyers understand and offer 
solutions to the contemporary challenges of global economic governance.  
 
1. ROBERT HOWSE AND THE PRESENT BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW 
 
 In a recent publication, the Canadian professor Robert Howse1 invites us – 
international lawyers – to rethink the boundaries of the field of international 
economic law.2 He calls our attention to the fact that only a few of us possess 
appropriate knowledge of economics to reflect upon and deal with the 
contemporary problems of global economic governance.3 He has in mind our 
limitations when coping with the political, social and economic consequences 
                                                      
1 Robert Howse is a Canada-born law professor at the New York University School of Law, located in 
the United States.  
2 For an overview of the legal field as a professional and intellectual arena structured and organized by 
shared core features, see Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 
HASTINGS L.J. 805 (Richard Terdiman trans., 1987). For the application of Bourdieu’s view to 
international trade law field, see Andrew Lang, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER NEOLIBERALISM: 
REIMAGINING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER 186-188 (2011). 
3 See Robert Howse, Economics for Progressive International Lawyers: a Review Essay, 5 LONDON REVIEW OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 187–196 (2017). 
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arising out of the unequal distribution of the gains and losses of the last three 
decades of globalisation. It seems that his concern lies, particularly, in the apparent 
mismatch between the powerful position held by international lawyers in the 
world economy and our lack of satisfactory understanding of economics, or 
perhaps uncritical acceptance of dominant economic doctrines as valid and 
legitimate. To understand the ways in which international lawyers have been 
implicated in managing the present-day international economic order, as well as in 
shaping the conditions of possibility for transforming it, he offers a brief account 
of his own experience as a junior scholar in North America to illustrate how law 
students have trained in the IEL expertise since the late-1980s. 
 In his recollection, Howse describes the steps undertaken by him to accede to 
the IEL field.4 At university, he was initiated into the characteristic ways of 
thinking of and arguing about IEL rules, institutions and doctrines. A combination 
of historical, theoretical and doctrinal lessons taught him, implicitly, where, why 
and how the field’s boundary was established and sustained. Following a long 
jurisprudential tradition across Western countries, the disciplinary line was drawn 
by attributing an ontological definition to IEL, which would carry with it implicit 
normative consequences. International economic law, recalls Howse, has been 
taught as “an instrument that serves rational international economic policy; 
rational policy is about efficiency; efficiency leads to growth; efficiency requires 
open markets, with strong protections for property and contractual rights and 
disciplines on government intervention. Questions of justice or redistribution 
should remain ‘elsewhere’: they do not belong to international economic law.”5  
 To my mind, Howse’s recollection calls attention, consciously or otherwise, 
to the effects of a fundamental, but often neglected, mode of expert governance6 
employed by the IEL field, disciplinary boundary.7 The notion of boundaries tends to 
cause lawyers to think of IEL as a technique8 for controlling the movement of 
                                                      
4 Howse, above n 3, at 188-189. 
5 Howse, above n 3, at 188. 
6 Inspired by science and technology studies (STS) literature, modes of expert governance are conceived as 
disciplinary mechanisms for the production, management and application of knowledge, norms and 
identities. They are created and used to coordinate expert systems and purposive action. In this sense, 
they are relatively institutionalised structures of governing decision-making constituted by a characteristic 
range of substantive and procedural assumptions as well as styles of thinking and reasoning. 
Consequently, they are employed to make, sustain and transform knowledge, norms and identities with 
the purpose of applying them to frame the issues under consideration and craft arguments in order to 
influence concrete situations or to prevent and resolve disputes. The political and intellectual process 
through which knowledge, norms and identities are constituted and adapted is defined as governance. For 
a STS overview of expert governance, see generally Alan Irwin, STS Perspectives on Scientific Governance, in 
THE HANDBOOK OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES (Edward J. Hackett et al (eds.), 2008). 
7 For an overview of disciplinary demarcation and professional boundary, see generally Michel Callon, 
Introduction: the embeddedness of markets in economics, 46 THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 1-57 (1998); Sida Liu, 
The Legal Profession as a Social Process: A Theory on Lawyers and Globalization, 38 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 676–
677 (2013). 
8 Technique is conceived as a characteristic style of organising material, procedural and aesthetical 
features into formal methods, skills and routines that produce outcomes associated with universality, 
durability, stability, scientific objectivity and political neutrality. Legal technologies tend to include some 
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meanings across space through demarcation. It is implicated directly in controlling 
what and who count or not as part of IEL, and, indirectly, in determining which 
rules, actors and knowledge are authoritative and legitimate. Within the IEL field, 
demarcation is a process involving decision-making and consensus-building. The 
consensus around the authority and legitimacy of norms, actors and ideas is built 
up by a discipline’s ritualised process of framing and answering questions.9 The 
responses are choices about intellectual, normative and political matters. They may 
take the form of a project, theory, method or argument. If successful in achieving 
internal consensus, these responses are likely to produce powerful spatial effects 
over legal expertise and might be used to affect global policymaking. They, 
therefore, serve not only to establish and sustain the IEL frontiers today but also 
to structure the ways in which lawyers understand and respond to the problems 
arising from the world economy.  
 Moreover, disciplinary demarcation is sensitive to political and intellectual 
dynamics of expert differentiation. Boundaries are shaped by the continuous 
professional practices and intellectual debates of international lawyers located 
inside and outside10 the IEL field. In this context of global economic governance, 
boundary-drawing is a process of relational contestation undertaken by distinct 
professions engaged in influencing policy- and law-making. Demarcation is, in this 
sense, a disciplinary technique employed to vindicate the existence of a(n) 
(exclusive) domain for the application of IEL expertise to a broad range of 
programmes, rules, regimes, ideas and methods. Therefore, the boundaries of 
international economic law are continuously restated by lawyers as another 
strategy of reaffirming the field’s identity, mission and influence in global 
economic governance.  
 Rethinking Howse’s narrative through the lens of disciplinary boundaries 
opens the possibility of retelling his own recollection from a distinct angle. As I 
shall discuss below,11 some lawyers, situated predominantly in North America in 
the late 1970s, proposed to use a combination of theories and methods grounded 
in legal realism, functionalism and pragmatism, to reimagine the international law 
                                                                                                                                         
of the following elements: “(1) certain ideologies – legal instrumentalism and managerialism […] (2) 
certain categories of experts – especially scholars, bureaucrats and practitioners who treat the law as a 
kind of tool or machine and who see themselves as modest but expertly devoted technicians; (3) a 
problem-solving paradigm – an orientation toward defining concrete, practical problems and toward 
crafting solutions; (4) a form of reasoning and argumentation, from eight-part tests to reasoning by 
analogy, to the production of stock types of policy arguments to practices of statutory interpretation or 
citation to case law” (Annelise Riles, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE: LEGAL REASONING IN THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL MARKETS (2011)). 
9 Disciplinary questions with powerful demarcation effects are: what is international economic law? What 
are the sources of IEL? What are the interpretative methods? How does IEL relate to other provinces of 
(public/private; domestic/regional/international) law and to other domains of international economic 
policymaking (e.g. economics, international relations, political and social sciences). Who has 
competence/jurisdiction/expertise over the matter? 
10 For instance, foreign affairs and trade ministries, law schools and firms, non-governmental 
organisations, domestic and international courts and institutions for economic affairs. 
11 See generally below n 46-49, and accompanying text. 
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of world economy as a distinct, specialised domain of expertise. They offered a 
new conceptual definition12 and employed it to rework a set of legal norms and 
ideas in order to support and universalise programmes for international economic 
law and governance. This involved demarcating the authority of their expertise 
inside and outside of the legal domain.13  
 Externally, they employed IEL expertise to claim ultimate competence over 
legal rules, institutions and doctrines that constituted and regulated the 
international economic order. This mainly involved disciplinary disputes with 
other international economic policymakers to exert legitimate authority over the 
international laws of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and international investment 
agreements (IIAs). Internally, historical narratives were amalgamated with legal 
and economic theories so as to assert the existence of a special body of positive 
norms and regimes, which required a specialised set of knowledge and skills 
distinct from other (public/private and international/domestic) law provinces. 
These unique characteristics led to the gradual formation of a distinguished 
intellectual and professional field, holding a specific identity and mission. This 
view of international economic law was chiefly developed in the late 1980s in the 
Anglo-American context. It quickly spread out after the end of the Cold War and 
the rise of the United States as the economic hegemon. By the early 2000s, when I 
was initiated in the IEL field, what today can be called the ‘Anglo-American 
vision’ had already become the orthodoxy as much as in the Bretton Woods 
institutions, the Bank for International Settlement (BIS), the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) as in Brazilian law schools and firms, companies and 
government.  
 What this brief reinterpretation of Howse’s account seems to suggest is that 
drawing boundaries has less to do with finding the field’s normative, economic or 
natural foundations. Rather, it appears to be more related to strategic positions 
taken by historically situated lawyers who intended not only to exercise influence 
by claiming exclusive expertise over certain institutional and jurisprudential 
domains but also to engage in the realisation of specific projects for global 
economic governance. These decisions are not made in the abstract. They often 
involve pledging their commitment to intellectual traditions and affiliating to 
professional groups, and so affected by the preoccupations, moral values and 
                                                      
12 Already described by Howse (see above n 5, and accompanying text). 
13 Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy-and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 
96 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 98-99 (2002). See also David Kennedy, The 
International Style in Postwar Law and Policy, 1 Utah L. Rev. 7-103 (1994); Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: 
The Juridicization of International Trade Relations, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 775-776 (1996–1997); Joseph 
H.H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats, 35 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 194-197 (2001). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3194660 
 
 
Rafael Lima Sakr          Beyond History and Boundaries 
 
 
 7 
interests of national elites, transnational experts and, of course, legal 
communities.14  
 Three such choices seem particularly important to reflect upon since they are 
at the core of the IEL field’s identity/mission, and so might be useful as stepping-
stones to find responses to the current issues facing global economic governance. 
First, by ascribing a definition to international economic law, ideas and practices 
are ex ante framed in and out of the IEL expertise. Second, by qualifying particular 
methods as authoritative to identify which norms and regimes are part of IEL, a 
set of techniques is included while the rest is dismissed as non-IEL for being 
unable to entail valid and authoritative responses. Finally, by agreeing on a 
programme, alternatives are marginalised and perhaps turn into either ideological 
rivals or expert competitors to the IEL field itself.  
 In the Anglo-American environment where Howse is situated, the majority of 
international lawyers have regarded themselves as liberal, cosmopolitan experts 
who, alongside other specialists and policymakers, are committed to promoting 
the rise of living standards through the application of scientific knowledge and 
techniques to rules and institutions of global economic governance, but whose 
efforts have been historically slowed down by political, ideological or economic 
forces. As emphasised by Howse, the acceptance of IEL as a neutral instrument 
devised for promoting and sustaining – what has been called – a Neoliberal 
programme15 for global economic governance, through a particular set of 
international and domestic rules, institutions and doctrines, singles out a much 
wider constellation of potentially applicable legal ideas, practices, projects and 
norms.16 The unproblematic understanding and the commitment of contemporary 
lawyers to Neoliberalism often marginalise relevant questions related to social 
justice and economic redistribution by setting humans rights and development 
policies outside the field’s domain.17 
 This conventional understanding – dominant since the 1980s – has recently 
lost its external appeal.18 The succession of political, social and economic crises of 
                                                      
14 David Kennedy, The Twentieth Century Discipline of International Law in the United States, in LOOKING BACK 
AT LAW’S CENTURY 409-414 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002). 
15 For the definition of Neoliberalism, see below n 91, and accompanying text. 
16 Howse, above n 3, at 188-189, and accompanying text. 
17 Howse, above n 3, at 188-189. See also Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global 
Governance by Judiciary, 27 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9-77 (2016). 
18 See generally Timothy Meyer, Saving the Political Consensus in Favor of Free Trade, 70 VAND. L. REV. 985-
1026 (2017). See also Michael Spence, Donald Trump and the New Economic Order (2006), 
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/nationalist-approach-to-economic-policy-by-michael-
spence-2016-11; Anatole Kaletsky, The Crisis of Market Fundamentalism (2016), https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/populist-revolt-crisis-of-capitalism-by-anatole-kaletsky-2016-12; Kemal 
Derviş, The Win-Win Fantasy of Liberal Democracy (2017), https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/failure-to-predict-brexit-and-trump-by-kemal-dervis-2016-12; Michael J. 
Sandel, Lessons from the populist revolt (2017), https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/lessons-from-
the-populist-revolt-by-michael-sandel-2017-01?barrier=accesspay; Rohinton Medhora, The Future of Trade 
(2017), https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/the-future-of-trade-by-rohinton-p--medhora-2017-
06?barrier=accesspay; Helmut K. Anheier, Rage Against the Elites (2017), https://www.project-
syndicate.org/onpoint/rage-against-the-elites-by-helmut-k--anheier-2017-10?barrier=accesspay; Paola 
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the early 21st century has caused people across jurisdictions to either distrust or 
challenge the widespread consensus around the benefits of the Neoliberal style of 
governing the world economy. This entailed a challenge to the legitimacy and 
authority of international economic regimes and organisations, on the one hand, 
and policymaking experts (generally) and lawyers (particularly), on the other. The 
2000-2002 Dot-com bubble, the 2001 Turkish crisis, the 2007-2009 global 
financial crisis, the 2010-2012 European sovereign debt crisis, the 2014 Russian 
crisis and the 2014-2017 Brazilian crisis are perceived as having exposed the 
vulnerabilities of global economic law and governance. They also have unveiled 
that the international management of economic globalisation and its crises, 
through expert application and interpretation of IEL rules and institutions, has 
impacted countries and individuals in uneven ways.  
 Additionally, the lack of effective or satisfactory responses by political and 
expert elites have increased popular dissatisfaction.19 Many people in developed 
countries discovered what their peers in the developing world had figured out a 
long time ago: globalisation produces structural imbalances between winners and 
losers. Using their privileged position, these individuals, who believed they were 
left behind, expressed their frustration by attacking important pillars of the 
international economic order. The years of 2016-2017 have witnessed two more 
significant and effective assaults in the Anglo-American context: Brexit and 
Trump’s election.20 
 
2. STEVE CHARNOVITZ AND THE PRESENT HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW 
 
 At present-day, The Field of International Economic Law by the American 
professor Steve Charnovitz21 symbolises the disciplinary consensus around the 
                                                                                                                                         
Subacchi, Economic Crises and the Crisis of Economics (2017), https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/economists-should-restore-lost-credibility-by-paola-subacchi-2017-01; 
Richard Baldwin, Trump’s Anachronistic Trade Strategy (2017), https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/trump-trade-policy-tariffs-by-richard-baldwin-2017-02; Dani Rodrik, Too 
Late to Compensate Free Trade’s Losers (2017), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/free-
trade-losers-compensation-too-late-by-dani-rodrik-2017-04; Dani Rodrik, Straight Talk on Trade (2017), 
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/trump-win-economists-responsible-by-dani-rodrik-
2016-11; Dani Rodrik, Too Late to Compensate Free Trade’s Losers (2017), https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/free-trade-losers-compensation-too-late-by-dani-rodrik-2017-04. 
19 See generally Anthea Roberts, Being Charged by an Elephant: A story of globalization and inequality (2017), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/being-charged-by-an-elephant-a-story-of-globalization-and-inequality/; Kaushik 
Basu, Inequality in the Twenty-First Century (2017), https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/profit-sharing-basic-income-by-kaushik-basu-2017-12. 
20 The British citizens voted in the 2016 referendum to take the United Kingdom out of the European 
Union. Trump campaigned and now has sought to implement America First, a nationalist and 
protectionist policy that has led the United States to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement, to pull Canada and Mexico into renegotiations of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, and to threaten to dismantle or exit from the WTO.  
21 Steve Charnovitz is a US-born law professor at the George Washington University Law School, located 
in the United States.  
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history of international law of the world economy.22 Section I starts off by 
providing a brief introduction to the most-acceptable views on the two-core 
ontological (what is IEL?) and epistemological (how is IEL identified?) questions 
underlying the field and by pointing out that both are still unsettled. Then, 
Charnovitz attempts to offer his own concept by merging the very broad 
meanings of “international + economic + law” with a functionalist method.23 “A 
[international] law of the world economy could possibly apply to three 
phenomena: (i) rules as between states, (ii) rules for how states treat individuals, 
and (iii) rules for individual to individual transactions.”24 However, he notices that 
“[that definition is] perhaps too broad. Consequently a reconsideration of method 
may be required.” 25 To deal with the over-inclusiveness, Charnovitz uses legal 
functionalism to acknowledge tactically the existence of “specialized bodies of 
public international law without necessarily classifying them as part of [IEL].” 26 
The result seems not to be satisfactory since he falls back to considerations about 
the complexities in determining the nature of IEL. To move forward, Charnovitz 
turns strategically to history in order to find in the past evidence to fill his abstract 
concept of IEL with concreteness. 
 
A. The Institutional History of International Economic Law   
 In Section II, the history of the IEL field is chronicled as a series of 
progressive moments that tie economic crises to institutional responses and legal 
justifications.27 Very similar to other conventional accounts28, Charnovitz provides 
a timeline of the IEL evolution, indicating the existence of legal rules and 
institutions that were used from the golden age of British-led free trade to the 
interwar period, and then to the post-war international economic order. He also 
                                                      
22 See generally Steve Charnovitz, The Field of International Economic Law, 17 J. INT’L. ECON. L. 607-626 
(2014). For like-minded conventional narratives about the history of international economic law, see 
generally the widely accepted works of Gerhard Loibl, International Economic Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(Malcolm Evans, ed., 2003); Aust Anthony, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); Asif H. Qureshi 
and Andreas R. Ziegler, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (2007); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (2008); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY: CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM AND MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE OF 
INTERDEPENDENT PUBLIC GOODS (2012); and Matthias Herdegen, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW (2016). 
23 “A [international] law of the world economy could possibly apply to three phenomena: (i) rules as 
between states, (ii) rules for how states treat individuals, and (iii) rules for individual to individual 
transactions” (Charnovitz, above n 22, at 607-611).  
24 Ibid, at 610.  
25 Ibid, at 610.  
26 Ibid, at 611.  
27 Ibid, at 611-616.  
28 See generally Loibl, above n 22; Aust, above n 22; Qureshi and Ziegler, above n 22; Lowenfeld, above n 
22; John H. Jackson, Part I: The state of international economic law – 2005, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 3-15 (2005); 
John H. Jackson, International Economic Law: Complexities and Puzzles, 10 J. Int’l Econ. L. 3-12 (2007); 
Gilbert R. Winham, The Evolution of the World Trading System – The Economic and Policy Context, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (Daniel Bethlehem ed., 2009); Michael J. 
Trebilcock et al, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (2012); Petersmann, above n 22; and 
Herdegen, above n 22. 
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chooses, as many others, to emphasise the international regulation of trade affairs 
due to their exceptional importance to the IEL history.29  
 The conventional narrative tells that from the late 19th century until 1914 the 
world trade was governed by the so-called Liberal international economic regime 
centred on the classical principle of freedom of commerce.30 The outbreak of 
World War I massively disrupted the international trading system of bilateral and 
preferential arrangements rudimentarily tied by MFN clauses. The peace did not 
repair the fractions. Rather, the 1919 Versailles Treaty contributed to produce 
long-term, deleterious impacts on Germany’s economy, pushing it to adopt a 
predatory economic strategy. This contributed partially to a general surge in 
beggar-thy-neighbour measures throughout the 1920s. In this context, the MFN 
clause fell into disuse encouraging countries to enter into bilateral arrangements.  
 The international trading system was already severely cracked by the end of 
the 1920s when the Great Depression caused the downfall of many domestic 
economies.31 To preserve national production and employment, extreme forms of 
discriminatory and protectionist measures were adopted. The Smoot-Hawley 
Tariff Act enacted by the United States in 1930 was the most notorious for quickly 
provoking comparable retaliatory reactions by its major trading partners.32 All 
these predatory policies not only exacerbated the effects of the Great Depression 
but also led the international trade regime to an institutional paralysis. When the 
1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act was passed by the US Congress the time 
for peaceful free trade policies was gone. The outbreak of World War II cemented 
the end of the Liberal international economic order.  
 The combination of the Franco-German economic revanchism, generalised 
trade wars and the Great Depression, with an ineffective Liberal trading system 
and marginal classical international law, served as history lessons for what was 
supposed to be a new regime for the world economy.33 These understandings were 
                                                      
29 Charnovitz calls particular attention to a group of bilateral and multilateral initiatives that produced 
embryonic international law norms and regimes, which later would evolve into the GATT or other 
international economic agencies. For instance, the 1890 International Union for the Publication of 
Customs Tariffs would become today’s International Customs Tariff Bureau, while most-favoured-nation 
(MFN) and national treatment standards established under peace, friendship and commerce treaties were 
widely used in drafting the GATT. He justifies the focus on international trade law on economics: [a] 
timeline for all of [IEL] would be too lengthy for a short essay, but it would be possible to construct a 
timeline underlying the construction of the world trading system in the late 1940s. He adds “[f]rom the 
scholarship that I am aware of, the trading system is a common element of everyone’s concept of [IEL]” 
(Charnovitz, above n 22, at 611-612).  
30 Charnovitz, above n 22, at 611-614. See also Trebilcock et al, above n 28, at 23-24; Lowenfeld, above n 
22, at 21-23; Winham, above n 28, at 9-13; Herdegen, above n 28, at 14-15; John H. Jackson, The Evolution 
of the World Trading System – The Legal and Institutional Context, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 31-33 (Daniel Bethlehem ed., 2009). 
31 Ibid. 
32 The 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act was responsible for raising the United States’s duties on imports to 
an average of 60, its highest tariff rates in the 20th century (Trebilcock et al, above n 28, at 23). 
33 Charnovitz, above n 22, at 614-616; Jackson (2007), above n 28, at 3-4; Jackson, above n 30, at 31-34; 
Lowenfeld, above n 22, at 21-26; Winham, above n 28, at 14; Trebilcock et al, above n 28, at 24-25; 
Herdegen, above n 28, at 195-197. 
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used, during and after the Second World War, for choosing economic policies and 
designing legal norms and regimes to lay the foundations for a new international 
economic order. When it had become reasonably clear to the allies that World War 
II would be shortly over, the Anglo-American diplomacy paved the way for 
concluding the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944. This agreement set forth a 
comprehensive plan to establish specialised international organisations for 
reconstructing and governing the global economy under the future United 
Nations.34 Following the end of the war, the International Monetary Fund and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later the “World Bank”) 
were duly created. However, the International Trade Organisation (ITO) failed to 
come into existence, largely because of the United States’ refusal to ratify its 
Charter in 1947, arguing that its rules would impose excessive constraints on 
domestic economic sovereignty.35 
 Alternatively, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, an interim 
agreement, negotiated in 1947 as a prelude to the ITO, became, “through the 
magic of practice,” the permanent institutional architecture for the multilateral 
trading system until the establishment of the World Trade Organisation in 1995.36 
Between 1947 and 1994, the GATT not only evolved institutionally but also had 
its mandate and membership expanded.37 Under the GATT, eight multilateral 
rounds of trade negotiations were concluded. The first six rounds (from the 1947 
Geneva Conference to the 1963-1967 Kennedy Round) focused almost exclusively 
on market access. The 1973-1979 Tokyo Round, although also promoted 
substantial tariff reductions, sought to negotiate for the first time new rules and 
policies, directing attention to various areas of non-tariff barriers to trade. The 
1986-1994 Uruguay Round, the last and most complex negotiation under the 
GATT, entailed a profound transformation in the world trading system. The 
establishment of the WTO was one of its central achievements followed closely by 
                                                      
34 More precisely, the Bretton Woods Agreement envisaged the creation of three new international 
economic organisations: IMF, World Bank and ITO. The IMF, responsible for governing global 
monetary policy through the maintenance of exchange rate stability, and the provision of assistance to 
countries facing balance of payment crises. The World Bank was in charge of international financial 
policies, which consisted initially of providing reconstruction to countries whose economies had been 
devastated by the Second Wold War. After having successfully contributed to the Marshall Plan, the 
mandate of the World Bank was expanded to focus on providing development capital to developing 
countries. The ITO was conceived to govern the negotiation and administration of a new international 
trading regime (Trebilcock et al, above n 28, at 24-25). 
35 Interestingly, the conventional literature often goes beyond the negotiations leading up to the draft 
ITO Charter. Notwithstanding, Charnovitz’s institutional storyline stops at this historical landmark, 
leaving the impression that the events prior to the GATT rest on the past while placing the post-1947 
institutions in the present. This understanding would make sense if Charnovitz’s jurisprudential narrative 
followed the same timeline; however, as I shall discuss below, he does not. Instead, he tells the evolution 
of IEL jurisprudence from the interwar period until the early 1990s, and then to the present. 
36 Hélène Ruiz Fabri, Chapter 16 - Regulating trade, investment and money, in The Cambridge Companion to 
International Law 365-366 (James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi, ed. 2012). 
37 Jackson, above n 28, at 4; Jackson, above n 30, at 34-37, 42-43; Lowenfeld, above n 22, at 46-67; 
Winham, above n 28, at 14-21; Trebilcock et al, above n 28, at 24-26; Herdegen, above n 28, at 15-16, 
195-199. 
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the reform of the dispute settlement mechanism and the unprecedented expansion 
of regulatory competence over trade in agriculture, textiles and services, 
intellectual property and investments.38  
 Thus, the adoption of the WTO agreements in 1994 closes the final chapter 
of the institutional storyline. From ITO’s tragic failure to GATT’s defective birth 
and its incremental improvements throughout multilateral rounds until the 
acceptance of the WTO ‘constitution’, conventional history teaches that the 
contemporary world trading system is the product of a progressive evolution of 
institutional trade practices of sovereign states in pari passu with the continuous 
expansion of global economic interdependence.   
 
B. The Jurisprudential History of International Economic Law   
 Juxtaposed with this institutional storyline, Charnovitz provides a historical 
account that identifies the IEL field with the progression of canonical writings.39 
In section III, he retells the conventional narrative of the evolution of legal ideas 
and practices that led up to the formation of a vernacular of concepts and 
techniques employed by the ‘champions’ of IEL to make sense of international 
economic relations. The jurisprudential development is closely knitted to the 
continuous institutionalisation of international economic governance.40 
 The jurisprudential story begins by acknowledging the German-American 
Ernst Feilchenfeld (1898–1956) as the patron of the term international economic law.41 
Yet, Charnovitz asserts that “[i]f anyone should be recognised as the father of 
[IEL], it is the German-British Georg Schwarzenberger (1908–91), a professor of 
international law at the University of London, who began writing on [IEL] in 
1942.”42 Schwarzenberger authored seminal works in IEL over three decades. In 
his classical 1966 course delivered at The Hague Academy of International Law, 
IEL is defined as a specialised province of public international law constituted of a 
sufficiently coherent, self-contained corpus of legal rules created by legal subjects, 
and not by deductions from abstract principles, with the purpose of regulating 
                                                      
38 Other important achievements were the following: the replacement of the ‘GATT à la carte’ approach 
for the ‘single understanding’ approach ensured that all members would be subject to the entire body of 
WTO agreements; and the creation of the Dispute Settlement Body represented the passage from a 
power-oriented to a rule-oriented system. 
39 Charnovitz, above n 22, at 616-624.  
40 In contrast to Section II however, section III focuses almost exclusively on the IEL jurisprudence 
developed from the 1940s until the 2010s, leaving aside canonical texts that were older or solely dedicated 
to international trade law. This far-reaching storyline differs not only from the institutional story but also 
from the conventional literature. Since Charnovitz does not explain these differences, I will follow the 
mainstream accounts, which means to limit the canonical narrative to 1994, and complement it with 
international trade law. 
41 Ernst Feilchenfeld, firstly, coined the term in his 1938 book The Next Step. A Plain Man’s Guide to 
International Principles (Charnovitz, above n 22, at 2014: 616-617. See also Ernst H. Feilchenfeld, THE NEXT 
STEP. A PLAIN MAN’S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES (1938), at 22–23). 
42 Charnovitz, above n 22, at 2014: 617.  
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public-law aspects of international economic transactions.43 The term international 
trade law is not employed in this work. Rather, the regulation and 
institutionalisation of inter-state trade affairs are regarded under the realm of IEL.  
 Until the 1980s, Schwarzenberger was the leading, but not the only, scholar of 
IEL. The British Leslie C. Green (1920-2011) and David Hughes Parry (1893-
1973) and the Hungarian-American Stephen A. Silard also employed the term IEL 
and advocated for the existence of a new branch of international law.44 Despite 
their scholarly efforts, Charnovitz points out that the concept international economic 
law was not “extensively used in international law literature during the 1950s, 
1960s, or 1970s. But it does occasionally appear.”45 
 As a branch of international law, IEL only took off in the early 1980s.46 The 
Dutch Pieter VerLoren van Themaat (1916-2004) rediscovered the field in his 
treatise The Changing Structure of International Economic Law of 1981, whereby the 
Schwarzenberger’s definition was reintroduced and updated in light of the new 
context. The term gained currency shortly after among the 1980s generation of 
international economic lawyers.47 Nevertheless, Charnovitz confers to the 
American John H. Jackson (1932-2015) the title of “the greatest champion of the 
concept of [IEL]” for his extensive contribution to the field.48 Jackson’s seminal 
contribution was an entry on the term international economic law in the Encyclopaedia of 
Public International Law of 1985. This concept would be employed in his 
masterpiece of 1989, The World Trading System, whereby IEL is conceived not as a 
                                                      
43 “International Economic Law is concerned only with such aspects of economic phenomena as come 
within the purview of Public International Law. The reasons for this delimitation are not metaphysical. 
They are, partly, doctrinal and, partly, pragmatic” (Georg Schwarzenberger, The principles and standards of 
international economic, 117 RECUEIL DES COURS 7-8 (1966). See also, Georg Schwarzenberger, The Province and 
Standards of International Economic Law, 2 THE INTERNATIONAL LAW QUARTERLY 405-405 (1948); and 
Georg Schwarzenberger and E. D. Brown, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1976). 
44 Charnovitz, above n 22, at 619. See also Leslie C. Green, Book Review of International Arbitral Awards and 
International Tax Agreements, 1 JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY OF PUBLIC TEACHERS OF LAW 322-324 (1949); 
David Hughes Parry, The Place of Constitutional Law and International Law in Legal Education, 2 JOURNAL OF 
LEGAL EDUCATION 428-432 (1950); Stephen A. Silard, The Impact of the International Monetary Fund on 
International Trade, 2 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE LAW 121-132 (1968). 
45 Charnovitz, above n 22, at 619.  
46 Ibid, at 620.  
47 VerLoren van Themaat was followed by the German Norbert Horn and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, the 
Austrian Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern (1918-2001), and the American John Jackson and Robert Hudec 
(1934-2003). 
48 Ibid, at 620. For the wide acknowledgement of John Jackson as the inventor of IEL, see generally 
Kennedy, above n 13, expanded in David Kennedy, The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy: John 
Jackson and the Field of International Economic Law, 10 AM. UNIV. INT’L L. REV. 671-716 (1995); Robert 
Howse, The House that Jackson Built: Restructuring the GATT System, 20 MICHIGAN J. INT’L L. 107-119 (1999); 
Robert B. Thompson, John Jackson’s Legacy: Defining a Field, 19 J. INT’L ECON. L.317–322 (2016); Tomer 
Broude, A Field of his Own: John Jackson and the Consolidation of International Economic Law as a Scholarly 
Domain, 19 J. INT’L ECON. L. 329–331 (2016); Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Worthy of a Nobel: An Appreciation of 
John H. Jackson, 19 Journal of International Economic Law 353–354 (2016). For the role of John Jackson in 
IEL practice, see generally Debra P. Steger, John H. Jackson—WTO Institution Builder, 19 Journal of 
International Economic Law 339–341 (2016); Gary Horlick, John Jackson as a Resource for Scholars and 
Others, 19 J. INT’L ECON. L. 401–402 (2016); William J. Davey, John Jackson and the Rule of Law, 19 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 333-334 (2016). 
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well-defined concept. Rather, a functional approach is offered to identifying IEL 
rules and institutions, while avoiding the rigid demarcations between financial, 
monetary and trade law, and between international and domestic law.49 In this 
sense, international trade law is purposefully demarcated as a branch of IEL, 
whereas the GATT/WTO law is defined as the centrally organised system of the 
most complex and extensive trade rules and institutions. 
 Charnovitz’s jurisprudential history goes beyond John Jackson’s scholarly 
contribution accounting also for his leading role in the field of international 
economic law.50 Coincidently or not, the year of 1994 was not only remarkable for 
IEL lawyers due to the conclusion of the WTO agreement, but also for the 
professional acclamation of Jackson as the creator of the field.51 This celebration 
symbolises the end of the jurisprudential journey. From the classic work of 
Schwarzenberger to Jackson’s masterpiece, international economic law as a history 
of legal ideas and practices evolved from a formalist claim for normative 
autonomy to a functional approach to governing the world economy. 
 
C. Learning from the History of International Economic Law   
 The history of the IEL field told by Charnovitz is neither novel nor 
controversial. Rather, it represents the conventional narratives that are widely 
accepted, complemented and repeated by the mainstream literature. To 
understand the role of history in international economic law and governance, two 
questions are central. The initial one asks as to what we – international lawyers – 
have learned from these historical accounts. The above analysis suggests that the 
conventional narratives are constructed according to a characteristic style of legal 
history, which often combines an institutional story with a jurisprudential story. 
These accounts convey two central lessons aiming to organise the discipline’s 
moral values, ideas and methods around a normative core, which sustains the 
                                                      
49 Charnovitz, above n 22, at 620; John H. Jackson, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 25 (1997).  
50 Charnovitz explains (above n 22, at 621) that John Jackson, in his International Economic Law: Reflections 
on the “Boilerroom” of International Relations, argues that IEL “embra[ces] the law of government regulation 
of economic matters; and related legal relations including litigation and international institutions for 
economic relations. Indeed, it is plausible to suggest that ninety percent of international law work is in 
reality international economic law in some form or another” (John H. Jackson, International Economic Law: 
Reflections on the Boilerroom of International Relations, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 596 (1995)). Jackson also 
notes that [IEL] cannot be separated from public international law. In addition, he points to the value of 
a multidisciplinary approach to [IEL] which embraces not only economics, but also political science, 
cultural history, anthropology and geography (Ibid, at 598). Charnovitz goes further to show how the 
notion of IEL “becomes further solidified” by the contribution of other international lawyers and 
foundation of specialised law journals (above n 22, at 621-622).  
51 The 1994 Conference on Interdisciplinary Approaches organised by the American Society of 
International Law celebrated Jackson’s work as fundamental to the consolidation of the field’s intellectual 
and professional pillars. In the rest of section III, Charnovitz covers the contemporary developments, 
involving the solidification of IEL jurisprudence until 2011. In brief, this process encompassed the 
publication of three specialised journals and new books and treatises, and the creation of International 
Economic Law and Policy Blog in 2006 and the Society of International Economic Law in 2008 
(Charnovitz, above n 22, at 621-624).  
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imagination of IEL as an autonomous province. Ultimately, their aspiration is to 
provide legitimacy and authority to support the IEL field’s identity, mission and 
influence in global economic governance.  
 The first central lesson is learned from the story about the progressive 
institutionalisation of the world economy.52 The turn-to-institutions in 
international economic relations teaches that the foundation of contemporary 
international economic law going from 1944 to 1994 was realised through two 
gradual stages. The initial stage was precursory, serving to set up the normative 
architecture underscoring global economic governance.53 IEL rules and 
institutions negotiated by states are perceived as mostly defective, weak or 
incomplete, while their application is regarded as highly dependent on economic 
preferences and material power of contracting-parties. This notion of imperfect 
institutionalisation is used to explain the prevalence of the diplomatic and 
technical character, rather than legal or juridical, of the post-war international 
economic regime.  
 That precarious situation began to change in the 1970s, when the IMF, then 
the World Bank, and finally the GATT and international investment agreements, 
had their normative and institutional features reformed and advanced.54 This 
second stage increased the institutionalisation of international trade, monetary and 
financial regimes, furthering the implementation of (Neo-)Liberal policies by 
constraining state discretion and incrementally moving their governance towards 
more rule-oriented international systems of economic cooperation. This shows 
that, while the 1940s is perceived as the constitutive moment in which countries 
committed to the contemporary international economic order, it was only in the 
1980s that international law rules and institutions began to be used more 
extensively to govern inter-state economic relations. Therefore, this institutional 
story has been traditionally told not only as holding singular significance to today’s 
global governance, but also as having a foundational role in constituting the 
contemporary IEL field. It teaches, particularly, that IEL results from the 
successful institutionalisation of the Neoliberal programme through the gradual 
transformation of the global economic regime from politics to diplomacy to law.  
 The second central lesson comes from the advancement in jurisprudence as a 
response to the post-war move to institutions.55 The conventional narratives 
chronicle that some lawyers discovered that international legal norms and regimes 
devised to regulate international economic relations possessed a special quality. 
This led them to differentiate this ‘branch’ of international law from other 
                                                      
52 For the institutional story of international economic law, see generally above n 27-38, and accompanying 
text. 
53 See generally above n 27-37, and accompanying text. 
54 See above n 37-38, and accompanying text. 
55 For the jurisprudential story of international economic law, see generally above n 39-51, and 
accompanying text. 
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provinces.56 The 1940s generation led by Schwarzenberger is perceived by the 
traditional literature as concerned primarily with formal and legalist dimensions of 
IEL.57 This formalist-oriented mind-set is regarded as responsible for letting 
lawyers enclose themselves in excessive academicism, while other fields of 
international economic policymaking occupied the central position in global 
governance.  
 Side-lined for three decades, IEL expertise is considered to have been reborn 
to global economic governance only in the 1980s thanks to the determination of 
more pragmatically-driven, rather than academically-oriented, international 
lawyers. They sought to rethink legal expertise as a way of reclaiming their 
participation in international economic policy- and law-making.58 The 
conventional accounts chronicle how lawyers gradually shifted from a formalist, 
legalist, positivist mind-set towards functionalist, realist and pragmatic attitudes 
and mentality.59 They were less interested in ontological and epistemological 
disputes over the existence of IEL, and more preoccupied with its functions, 
effectiveness, and the application of its expertise to solve problems of the world 
economy. By strategically linking considerations of validity and effectiveness, the 
1980s generation led by Jackson significantly transformed the IEL field.60 
                                                      
56 Chronicled as a ‘eureka’ moment, they later found out that this unique domain was, in fact, an 
autonomous field, and so named it as international economic law. Despite the efforts of those 
frontrunners, the emergence of the IEL expertise is conventionally regarded as having had little or no 
influence over international economic law or governance. Three factors are considered to have 
collaborated for its disempowerment. The political and economic challenges pervading the 1950s, 1960s 
and 1970s would have accrued a chilling effect on international lawyers’ aspirations. Moreover, the 
postwar international economic order would have been operated and managed mostly by non-legal 
experts, to the extent that international economic affairs were considered of ‘low’ political priority and 
dominated by more ‘technical’, and less or none ‘juridical’, matters. Finally, the 1940s generation led by 
Schwarzenberger was too scholarly inclined and committed to stronger legalist and positivist views of 
international economic law (See above n 41-51, and accompanying text. See also Kennedy, above n 13, at 
61; Reich, above n 13, at 775-776; Weiler, above n 13, at 194-197; Howse, above n 13, at 98-99 (2002)). 
57 They focused on the formal question as to whether IEL was ontologically and epistemologically 
distinct from international law. Consequently, legal theory occupied a prominent place in debates about 
IEL’s nature, driving the choice of methods to identify formal concepts and legal sources. More 
specifically, IEL was conceptualised, examined and applied as if it were a coherent and self-contained 
system of distinguished positive rules and institutions (See above n 46-51, and accompanying text). 
58 See above n 22, 46-51, and accompanying text.  
59 See Charnovitz, above n 22. See also Weiler, above n Error! Bookmark not defined., at 194-197; 
Howse, above n 48, at 107-119, and n Error! Bookmark not defined., at 98-99; Reich, above n Error! 
Bookmark not defined., at 775-776; Hufbauer, above n 48, at 352-353; Broude, above n 48, at 329–331; 
Thompson, above n 48, at 317-320; Davey, above n 48, at 333-334. 
60 The 1980’s generation led by Jackson is praised for having introduced the central transformations that 
revived the IEL field. First, they bracketed the controversies over the formal autonomy of IEL, and 
recast their different views not as mutually exclusive responses to theoretical questions, but rather as 
alternative realist methodologies that could be chosen and applied to solve IEL-related disputes and 
problems according to personal conviction and contextual necessity. Charnovitz’s article depicts the 
move to functionalism in sections I and III. While section III accounts for the jurisprudential story, 
section I introduces the different ‘concepts’, ‘methods’ or ‘approaches’ to IEL. These legal ideas and 
techniques are presented not as ontological responses framed as true or false hypotheses provided by 
legal scholars in historically situated contexts. Rather, they are juxtaposed as ahistorical, neutral, scientific 
methodologies to be chosen by lawyers not due to their inherent validity or legitimacy but according to 
contextual considerations and personal belief (Charnovitz, above n 22, at 607-611, 616-624). Second, the 
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 These two central lessons provide the normative consensus underlying the 
contemporary field of IEL. By combining institutional and jurisprudential 
dimensions, the history of its constitution is regarded as having undergone 
through three steps: the 1940s as its formal, normative and intellectual roots, the 
1950s-1970s period as its institutional maturation but professional marginalisation, 
and, finally, the 1980s-1994 as its effective foundation. Legal functionalism, 
realism and pragmatism are the building blocks of the field’s identity, while its core 
mission is the progressive implementation of the Neoliberal programme for global 
economic governance through international law. 
 This leads to the second question: what is the function of history in the IEL 
expertise? It is common sense that history-telling is used by international lawyers as a 
mode of governance to control the movement of meanings across time. The 
traditional literature often offers narratives alike to manage and support a wide 
variety of projects, rules, institutions, theories and methods that constitute the IEL 
expertise. As analysed above, these accounts may take the form of institutional 
stories of the formation and development of IEL norms and regimes that 
nowadays underscore the international economic order. Likewise, they may 
contribute to the understanding and diffusion of current legal ideas and techniques 
by retelling the evolution of IEL jurisprudence. By connecting past and present, 
these history lessons organise and mould legal expertise, which in turn affects law-
making and interpretation. Moreover, these teachings are continuously reasserted 
as a strategy to sustain the authority and legitimacy of the IEL field’s identity and 
mission. This suggests that the way in which lawyers tell their own history plays an 
important role in shaping (directly) the boundaries of the IEL domain and 
influencing (indirectly) global economic governance. 
 
3. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW   
 
 The analyses of Howse’s and Charnovitz’s works suggest the operation of 
what I have called the traditional approach, a characteristic style of history-telling that 
widely dominates the field of international economic law. Charnovitz’s article 
illustrates how institutional and jurisprudential stories are habitually organized and 
merged into a ‘grand narrative’ about the origins and development of IEL, while 
Howse’s recollection exemplifies the way in which this instance of conventional 
                                                                                                                                         
move from grand theories to functionalist methods of analysis was combined with an instrumentalist 
approach to IEL, through which the validity and legitimacy of a legal norm or regime were tested against 
its effectiveness in providing the legal basis for dealing with concrete cases of international economic 
affairs. The instrumentalist turn is clearly reflected in section IV, whereby Charnovitz does not analyse 
the relationship between IEL and international law from a formal or normative viewpoint. In contrast, he 
examines whether and how IEL should influence or interact with international law with the aim of 
solving current challenges faced by global governance (Charnovitz, above n 22, at 624-625). Finally, this 
pragmatic perspective shifted the focus of IEL expertise from legal certainty and stability to problem-
solving, normative change and institutional progress. 
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accounts is routinely translated into history lessons and then taught to 
international lawyers worldwide. Together they show how the traditional approach 
has been used to combine institutional and jurisprudential teachings with the 
purpose of drawing a line dividing whom and what are parts of IEL. Particularly, 
this dominant style of history-telling is employed to determine what/who matters 
or not to the field’s past, and also to control what lessons should be taken into 
consideration today by lawyers to make or interpret IEL projects, rules, 
institutions and ideas.  
 Against this backdrop, I argue that the majority of international lawyers have 
successfully employed the conventional narratives to construct and sustain IEL as 
a professional and intellectual field. The traditional approach is continuously used 
as an expert mode of governing the legitimacy and authority of actors, ideas, rules 
and regimes. On the one hand, it is used to draw a temporal timeline dividing past 
and present for the IEL expertise. Legal norms, actors and knowledge that are not 
understood as being part of the 1980s (re-)foundational moment are mainly 
regarded as belonging to the past. Consequently, they do not or should not inform 
today’s practices and ideas. On the other hand, it is employed to draw spatial lines, 
separating which elements fit in and out the IEL discipline. Legal rules, actors and 
knowledge closely related to the Neoliberal programme for global economic 
governance are often acknowledged as part of IEL,61 while the ones identified 
with environmental, social, labour and development issues tend to fall outside the 
field, regardless of their economic relevance.62 Similarly, theories, methods and 
arguments associated with legal functionalism, pragmatism and realism are 
habitually received without ideological suspicion or intellectual scepticism, whereas 
the ones grounded in competing schools of thought63 are frequently dismissed or 
marginalised.  
 Furthermore, the disciplinary consensus produced through the traditional 
approach around the IEL boundaries entails important external consequences. By 
using the conventional narratives to assert the present field’s frontiers, 
international lawyers intend not only to claim exclusive authority over certain (and 
not other) institutional and jurisprudential domains but also to legitimise their 
pursuit of specific (and not other) projects for global economic governance. This, 
in turn, affects their interaction with other international economic policymaking 
experts as well as with international regimes for economic affairs. The purpose of 
using the traditional approach is, therefore, to empower international lawyers with 
legitimate authority to make sense of and arguments about official documents and 
behaviours of state and non-state actors (related to what they understood to be 
                                                      
61 For instance, the IMF, the World Bank, the GATT/WTO and IIAs. 
62 For instance, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), and the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO). 
63 For instance, legal positivism, natural law, Third-World Approaches to International Law, post-
colonialism, post-structuralism, and feminist jurisprudence. 
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part of international economic affairs) to politicians, diplomats, judges, other 
policymakers and scholars, students, and, very importantly, to themselves. 
 This suggests that the traditional approach to history-telling operates less as a 
means to reflect upon how past acts and choices led up to the present. Instead, it 
works backwardly by selecting and mobilising historical events to legitimise and 
validate the consensus around the linear connection between the IEL field’s 
origins, development, autonomy and present-day boundaries. In this sense, lessons 
that are ‘discovered’ in history tend to reflect collective or individual commitments 
of lawyers to intellectual traditions, normative projects and professional groups. In 
particular, my analysis indicates that the majority of lawyers have continuously 
applied the traditional approach to entrench and sustain the Neoliberal 
programme into the IEL expertise by controlling the authority and legitimacy of 
actors, ideas and practices as well as norms and regimes through the conventional 
accounts of jurisprudential and institutional stories. 
 Therefore, I believe that the limitations of international lawyers in addressing 
the current challenges to the international economic order have a great deal to do 
with the ways in which historical narratives have been used to legitimise and 
validate norms, actors and knowledge. My aim is to explore what an analysis of the 
IEL field’s history and boundaries can tell us today about the repertoire of ideas, 
practices, rules and institutions that was relegated to the dustbin of past due to 
disciplinary consensus. I am specifically interested in uncovering and criticising the 
strategies undertaken to entail demarcation effects so as to assist in broadening the 
horizons of possibility to propose alternatives to transform international economic 
law and governance. 
  
 
III. BETWEEN HISTORY AND BOUNDARIES: THE LIMITS OF 
THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO THE HISTORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 
 
As the previous section suggests, boundary-drawing and history-telling tend to be 
assumed as unrelated, or perhaps contrasting, disciplinary modes of governance 
situated on opposite sides of the IEL expertise. By contrast, the traditional 
approach has in fact combined history and boundaries, in order to reconstruct 
(what I have called so far) conventional narratives. The purpose of these historical 
accounts has been to legitimise and validate the IEL field’s borders by controlling 
the intra-expertise production of knowledge and norms, and to ensure its extra-
expertise influence by carving out an exclusive space for policymaking in global 
economic governance. By instrumentalising history to drawing boundaries, the 
past is subordinated to the present in order to determine as to whether a project, 
norm or idea is either a present-day outcome of progressive development (and so 
belonging to the field), an old (and non-applicable) relic or a non-part of the IEL 
domain. I suggest, therefore, that one possibility to rethink the current constraints 
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of the IEL expertise is through the understanding and critique of how the 
traditional approach has structured the interaction between history and 
boundaries. 
 There are numerous possibilities to approach the history of the IEL field 
rather than the traditional style.64 The conventional avenue of the 20th-century 
international law literature is – as explained by Marti Koskenniemi – to combine 
“accounts of the development of the States system with brief excursions into a 
well-defined circle of canonical texts.”65 This seems to capture how IEL has been 
historicised since the mainstream literature often combines stories of the 
institutional development of contracting-parties’ practice with brief doctrinal 
analysis of official documents and canonical texts.66  
 As I shall discuss below, the traditional approach tends, consciously or 
otherwise, to instrumentalise IEL history in order to justify and legitimise a 
particular programme by claiming it is the natural or logical consequence of a 
neutral and universal set of lessons. Indeed, this traditional style often blurs the 
line drawn to differentiate historical reconstructions from normative projects.67 
The peril of this approach consists of emphasising aspects of history that support 
one’s underlying policy-ideological-intellectual commitment as factual 
determinants while leaving others necessarily (and perhaps strategically) in the 
forgotten realm of the past. As shown by the previous section, there are two types 
of storylines (which might be combined or not) that have been routinely employed 
to tell the history of the IEL field with the aim of demarcating its boundaries. 
 The institutional story chronicles the evolution of IEL as the progressive 
development of practices of states and international organisations pari passu with 
the continuous expansion of global economic interdependence.68 It tends to 
overemphasise political or economic forces as structural drivers, while 
downplaying the role of moral, social or legal norms, institutions and doctrines.69 
Hence, this traditional style of history-telling is used to sustain lawyers’ 
                                                      
64 For an overview of approaches to international law history, see generally Bardo Fassbender and Anne 
Peters (eds.), THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012); James 
Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi (eds.), THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012). 
65 Martti Koskenniemi, A History of International Law Histories, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE 
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 960-961 (Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters eds., 2012).  
66 Section Error! Reference source not found. provides a brief analysis of the conventional history of 
international economic law. More specifically, I examined the ways in which Charnovitz accounts for the 
field’s origins by merging a linear account of crises and institutional responses with a story of 
jurisprudential evolution moving from formalism to functionalism.  
67 Koskenniemi points out that “[t]he dominant voice [in writing about international law histories] has 
sounded a sociological register: ‘Ubi societas, ibi ius’—although just what it means to say that the law 
‘reflects’ anterior social developments has seldom been broached in any depth. Much of this history is 
geared in a policy-oriented direction as prologue to this or that agenda of reforms” (Ibid, at 961). 
68 For a summary of the institutional story of international economic law narrated in traditional style, see 
generally above n 27-38, and accompanying text. 
69 For an overview of a legal history approach to international law as institutional practice, see generally 
Gerry Simpson, Chapter 1 - International law in diplomatic history, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi eds., 2012). 
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understanding of the GATT, IMF, World Bank and IIAs as servants, by-products 
of, or determined by, international economic relations.  
 The jurisprudential story accounts for IEL as the succession of canonical 
writings that provides a vernacular of concepts and techniques to understand the 
prevailing institutional interactions and state behaviour under global economic 
governance.70 The conventional narratives often overemphasise the evolution 
undergone by IEL jurisprudence from the 1940s mind-set characterised by a 
scholarly attitude and formalist-positivist views towards the 1980s mentality, which 
combined a pragmatic attitude and functionalist-realist visions.71 Thus, the 
traditional approach is employed to narrow the intellectual history to support 
lawyers’ instrumental efforts to justify and legitimate the (re-)foundation of the IEL 
field, with the aim of closing the gap between legal expertise and the rival 
policymaking disciplines. 
 These two types of legal storylines are often united through the commitment 
of the traditional approach to a view of history as a single and universal 
phenomenon. Contemporary lawyers often try to merge the intellectual and 
institutional stories by assuming that both are somehow intertwined teleologically 
and progress linearly.72 The purpose of the mainstream literature in providing 
these two accounts following one common trajectory seems to be an attempt to 
scientifically capture the single, universal reason driving the IEL history. Indeed, 
this grand narrative is conventionally remembered as a conflict against autocracy, 
nationalism, discrimination, unilateralism, and protectionism, as well as against 
legal idealism, and excessive formalism, positivism and academicism. By contrast, 
an ‘effective’, ‘legitimate’ and ‘fair’ international economic law results from 
cooperation, multilateralism, non-discrimination, reciprocity, and liberalism, as 
well as legal pragmatism, functionalism, realism and problem-solving attitude. At 
the core, IEL is imaged as a universally accepted mode of institutionalised expert 
governance of the global economy that aspires to impose formal and effective 
constraints upon sovereign discretion over trade, monetary and financial policies, 
while promoting a more peaceful world and economic welfare through 
interdependence.  
 By resorting to the IEL history, the mainstream literature aims to validate and 
legitimise its normative project through the conventional narratives that vindicate 
the naturalness, necessity or superiority of contemporary IEL norms and 
knowledge. The traditional approach is employed to root the rules, ideas and 
techniques related to the WTO/GATT, IMF, World Bank and IIAs in history 
                                                      
70 For an overview of a legal history approach to international law as legal ideas and practices, see generally 
Martti Koskenniemi, Chapter 2 - International law in the world of ideas, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi eds., 2012). 
71 For a summary of the jurisprudential story of international economic law in traditional style, see generally 
above n 39-51, and accompanying text. 
72 Martti Koskenniemi, Histories of International Law: Significance and Problems for A Critical View. 27 TEMPLE 
INTL. & COMP. L.J. 220-221 (2013). 
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lessons, so as to ascribe them meaning as part of an unfolding story of institutional 
and jurisprudential progress that serves to support the dominant, Neoliberal 
project.73 These historical reconstructions create, in turn, a disciplinary boundary 
by framing what is desirable in the IEL domain, while bracketing all other 
elements as ‘outsiders’.74 The dangerous consequence of combining the 
institutional and jurisprudential stories through the lens of the traditional style is to 
produce a teleological view of the conventional accounts as the single, neutral and 
universal history of international economic law. The ultimate result is, therefore, to 
blur the line between past and present. 
 Recently, a new trend in literature has extensively criticised the traditional 
approach for its ontological and epistemological shortcomings.75 For the aim of 
my discussion here, the critiques of the mainstream literature’s commitments to 
Modernism and Anglocentrism seem to bear great explanatory power. The 
combination of these two features appears to impose disciplinary limitations that 
have adversely impacted international economic law. These constraints result from 
the effects of the traditional approach over the interaction between the IEL 
history and boundaries. More specifically, it has produced a historical consensus 
around the IEL field’s origins and evolution, which has, in turn, entailed the 
central lessons that demarcate what and who count or not as IEL.76 Intra-
expertise, these teachings have been employed to shape not only projects, norms 
and knowledge but also the field’s identity and mission. Extra-expertise, they have 
                                                      
73 Orford makes a similar argument on how the dominant scholarship uses history to justify and 
legitimise free trade as the central project of contemporary international trade law and governance (Anne 
Orford, Theorizing Free Trade, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 701-
702 (Anne Orford, Florian Hoffmann and Martin Clark eds., 2016)). 
74 For instance, it often tries to construct the history of international trade law by tying it up with the 
institutional story about the steps leading up to the formation and development of the GATT and the 
jurisprudential story about GATT’s ‘birth defect’ that made legalist, positivist and formalist approaches 
unsuitable, and so demanded pragmatic, functionalist and realist methods. It ultimately instrumentalises 
these two ‘history lessons’ to develop theories, doctrines and arguments to solve contemporary issues on 
international trade law. 
75 For this new strand in international law scholarship, see generally Martti Koskenniemi, above n 65 and 
70, and his Law, Teleology and International Relations: An Essay in Counterdisciplinarity, 26 INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 3-34 (2012); Simpson, above n 69; Anghie, Antony, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE 
MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); Fre ́de ́ric Me ́gret, Chapter 3 - International law as law, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW (James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi eds., 2012); 
Emmanuelle Jouannet, THE LIBERAL-WELFARIST LAW OF NATIONS: A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2012). For international economic law, see specifically Lang, above n 2; Fabri, above n 36; Anne Orford, 
above n 73, and her Food Security, Free Trade and the Battle for the State Work, 11 JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1-67 (2015); James Thuo Gathii, AFRICAN 
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AS LEGAL REGIMES (2011); Sundhya Pahuja, DECOLONISING 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE POLITICS OF UNIVERSALITY 
(2011); Donatella Alessandrini, The World Trade Organization and development Victory of ‘rational choice’?, in 
Events: The Force of International Law (Johns, Fleur., Joyce, Richard John, and Pahuja, Sundhya (eds), 
2011); Kate Miles, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: EMPIRE, ENVIRONMENT AND 
THE SAFEGUARDING OF CAPITAL (2013); Luis Eslava, LOCAL SPACE, GLOBAL LIFE: THE EVERYDAY 
OPERATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (2015).  
76 Howse and Charnovitz seem to experience the demarcation effects produced by the traditional 
approach, see above n 4-5, 13-17 (Howse) and n 52-Error! Bookmark not defined. (Charnovitz), and 
accompanying text. 
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affected the authority and legitimacy of international lawyers over policy- and law-
making domains of global economic governance.  
 The critique of Modernism starts off by calling attention to the argumentative 
structure embedded in the traditional approach. The preliminary step to history-
telling is to define international economic law.77 This definition is habitually 
constructed upon two moves. It first assumes that lawyers are able to objectively 
isolate IEL from other social phenomena, such as morality, politics, and 
economics, as well as from domestic and international law, in order to provide a 
somehow definitive, abstract concept. Such a concept is often a specialised variation 
of the notion of IEL as a universal and neutral set of norms, regimes and 
doctrines that are legitimately produced and can be objectively interpreted. The second 
move is to accept that the positive rules and institutions underlying the IMF, 
World Bank, GATT/WTO and IIAs constitute the only, or the most relevant, 
body of international economic law.  
 These ontological and epistemological premises produce blind spots that 
often lead the traditional approach to overlook how intra-expertise political and 
intellectual struggles have shaped the contemporary IEL field. This implies that, to 
produce a universal history, conventional narratives frequently fail to take into 
consideration socio-economic contexts, political compromises or intellectual 
concessions responsible for making and interpreting IEL norms and regimes, 
while obscuring disciplinary bias and marginalising alternative ideas and practices 
within the IEL expertise.78 Therefore, embedded into the traditional approach, the 
Modernist commitment to teleology requires the adoption, preceded or not by 
theoretical justification, of a universal concept of international economic law as 
the condition sine qua non to begin the process of uncovering its history. This 
restricts, in turn, IEL history to the conventional narratives that often support the 
dominant programmes underpinning the concept chosen ex ante.  
 My analysis of Charnovitz’s article offers a good example of the perils arising 
from the Modernist style of IEL history. Two shortcomings are particularly 
important. First, the traditional literature narrows the notion of international 
economic law to the international laws of the GATT/WTO, IMF, World Bank 
and IIAs, accompanied or not by methodological reasons. The consequence is to 
impose a disciplinary demarcation that disregards any rule, institution or doctrine 
existing from 1944 to 1994 that falls outside such a narrow concept. Second, to 
reinforce this ontological and epistemological frame, the conventional narratives 
seem to function as an apologetic conduit providing legitimate and authoritative 
justifications for the prevalent body of contemporary IEL norms, regimes, 
practices and ideas. 
                                                      
77 See above n 5, 12-13 (Howse) and n 23-26, 60-Error! Bookmark not defined. (Charnovitz), and 
accompanying text.  
78 David Kennedy, The Disciplines of International Law and Policy, 12 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 12 (1999). 
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 The second critique is concerned with the overwhelming Anglocentrism 
surrounding and embedded into the conventional accounts.79 From physical places 
to intellectual debates to global policy-making, IEL is frequently experienced in 
the present-day mind-set and routines as an Anglo-American phenomenon. 
Locations such as Bretton Woods, New York, and Washington in the United 
States, London and Torquay in the United Kingdom are central to the 
historiography, where international lawyers have been constantly found, in some 
way, even today. Of course, other key places such as Geneva, Paris and Annecy, 
Brussels, Tokyo, as well as Havana, have also been historically important; 
however, the traditional approach seems to portray these places as islands, or 
perhaps containers, of Anglocentrism elsewhere. In fact, it seems discouragingly 
difficult and sometimes impossible to engage with international economic law 
without delving into Anglo-American diplomatic history, referring to ideas and 
practices about economic liberalism, multilateralism, and rule of law as imagined 
and implemented in the United States and the United Kingdom, or even 
communicating in the English language. This suggests the existence of an affinity 
between international lawyers’ disciplinary preference and their acceptance of 
Anglocentrism. Thus, the IEL expertise is experienced as dominated by 
Anglocentric-inspired or -reconstructed norms, regimes and doctrines, as well as 
concepts and knowledge. 
 This Anglocentrism leads one to wonder what kind of IEL history would be 
possible without summarising it to the role of the US (mainly), the UK 
(secondarily) and Western Europe in the construction and maintenance of the 
international economic governance? Indeed, the overwhelming majority of the 
contemporary narratives, following either institutional or jurisprudential storylines, 
seem to drive back to what and how British and Americans have done and written. 
Institutionally, the literature tends to equate IEL to the IMF, World Bank, 
GATT/WTO and IIAs, by either foregrounding their ancestors in the 19th-
century, Liberal economic system led by Great Britain, or emphasising their 
origins in the Anglo-American negotiations that resulted in the Atlantic Charter. 
More specifically, it often retells the establishment of the international economic 
order through the debate between the American Cordell Hull and Harry Dexter 
White, and the British John M. Keynes. Jurisprudentially, it does not and should 
not come as a surprise that the mainstream literature unequally emphasises ideas 
and practices produced by Anglo-American (trained) lawyers. In the 1940s, the 
father of IEL, Georg Schwarzenberger, was a Jewish person born in Germany 
who found refuge in 1934 in the United Kingdom, where he came to develop his 
scholarship on the province of IEL as a professor at the University of London. In 
the 1980s, the great champion of IEL, John H. Jackson, was an American-born 
                                                      
79 Likewise, Koskenniemi (above n 65 and 72), Anghie (above n 75) show how Eurocentrism shapes 
international law, while Orford (above n 73), Miles (above n 75) and Pahuja  (above n 75) demonstrate 
the effects of Eurocentrism/Anglocentrism over international economic law. 
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professor who, on different occasions, served the Office of the US Trade 
Representative. Therefore, the traditional approach seems to make it quite an 
impossible task to offer a credible account of international economic law and 
governance without adopting an Anglocentric viewpoint. 
 
 
IV. TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO THE HISTORY 
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 
 
In an attempt to address or avoid some of the shortcomings inherent to the 
traditional style of historicising international economic law, I provide below the 
contours of an alternative approach grounded in four strategies. 
 
1. WIDENING THE HISTORICAL BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW  
 
 The first strategy purports to place the origins and development of 
international economic law within a broader historical trajectory. I propose to 
widen the scope so as to analyse the ways in which IEL was ‘founded’ in relation 
not only to the ‘rest’ of international law but also to the ‘other’ international 
economic policymaking domains and institutionalised regimes of economic 
governance existing between 1944 and 1994. This consists of retelling institutional 
and jurisprudential stories in light of a more comprehensive frame. Hence, the aim 
is to prevent the bias and blind spots created by traditional narratives from 
constraining today’s IEL expertise in two important ways.  
 The acceptance of the idea of the GATT/WTO, the Bretton Woods 
institutions, the ICSID and IIAs as the unique, or perhaps ultimate, institutional 
and normative experiments of international economic governance since 1944, is a 
disciplinary pillar of the IEL field. This traditional perspective locks up IEL within 
dichotomous debates around utopian, Liberal, multilateralism versus apologetic, 
Welfarist, unilateralism. For instance, the history of international trade law looks 
very different from the conventional narratives if, instead of focusing only on the 
GATT and its internal conflicts, it accounts for the role of GATT in the battle 
against the UNCTAD and the COMECON for governing international trade 
affairs.80 Moreover, the jurisprudential consensus around the superiority of an 
                                                      
80 My argument is not that the mainstream literature has completely disregarded the existence of other 
international organisations or regimes specialising in economic affairs. Rather, I argue that it tends not to 
account for the other regimes as contenders for governing international economic relations. For instance, 
there were institutional alternatives to the GATT offered by competing expert projects and normative 
programmes that have been forgotten or ignored by the IEL history. From the 1950s until the early 
1990s, global trade governance was organised around three multilateral trade regimes: the GATT, the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (COMECON). For a general overview of the COMECON, see Endre Ustor, Decision-making in 
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, 134 RECUEIL DES COURS 163-295 (1971); Giuseppe Schiavone, 
THE INSTITUTIONS OF COMECON (1981); Jozef M. Van Brabant, THE PLANNED ECONOMIES AND 
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Anglo-American style of legal pragmatism, functionalism and realism developed 
since the 1980s singles out an innovative body of legal knowledge and practices 
produced since the 1940s.81 Not only has the traditional history led the IEL 
expertise to relegate a rich repertoire of legal ideas and techniques to the dustbin 
of the past, but it has also crystallised a disciplinary boundary that prevents recent 
preoccupations, concepts, theories and methods from growing or entering the 
field.82 For instance, it has marginalised relevant questions related to social justice 
and economic redistribution by justifying historically that development policies, 
environmental and labour concerns, and humans rights considerations fall outside 
the IEL domain. Therefore, a new approach to history purports to provide the 
ways to resituate the IEL expertise in a wider context of global economic 
governance. 
 
2. ENDOGENISING THE HISTORY AND BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW  
 
 I suggest that we suspend our habit of imagining IEL as a special body of legal 
rules and institutions, which can be empirically identified and scientifically 
analysed. In other words, IEL can be conceived not as a result of a unilateral 
process of normative, jurisprudential or institutional specialisation or 
fragmentation, which is possible to be ‘discovered’ and ‘apprehended’ by 
international lawyers, regardless their historical context, through the identification 
of a distinguishable group of universal norms and regimes holding a natural or 
logical speciality.  
 Instead, I propose to approach the foundation and evolution of international 
economic law as (part of) the creation and advancement of the IEL field, which 
                                                                                                                                         
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS (1990). For a general overview of the UNCTAD, see Said 
El-Naggar, The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: background, aims and policies, 128 RECUEIL 
DES COURS 241-345 (1969); Mohamed Bennouna, DROIT INTERNATIONAL DU DÉVELOPPEMENT: TIERS 
MONDE ET INTERPELLATION DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1983); John Toye, UNCTAD AT 50: A SHORT 
HISTORY (2014). 
81 Today’s mainstream jurisprudence of international economic law has often neglected the development 
of ideas, methods and doctrines undertook by international lawyers located outside the Anglo-American 
world. While American and British lawyers would only reengage with IEL in the 1980s, jurisprudential 
debates on IEL matters were intensively carried out in other places, such as Algeria, Egypt, France, and 
Nigeria. For a general overview of IEL in these legal traditions, see Mohamed Bedjaoui, TOWARDS A NEW 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1979) and Madjid Benchikh, DROIT INTERNATIONAL DU SOUS-
DÉVELOPPEMENT: NOUVEL ORDRE DANS LA DÉPENDANCE (1983) [Algeria]; El-Naggar, above n 80, and 
Georges Abi-Saab, Progressive development of the principles and norms of international law relating to the new 
international economic order (United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-Genera 
A/39/504/Add.1, 23 October 1984) [Egypt]; Nguyen Quoc Dinh., Patrick Daillier, and Alain 
Pellet, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1975) and Dominique Carreau, Thiébaut Flory and Patrick 
Juillard, DROIT INTERNATIONAL E ́CONOMIQUE (1978) [France]; U. Oji Umozurike, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND COLONIALISM IN AFRICA (1979) and Taslim Elias, NEW HORIZONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1992) 
[Nigeria]. 
82 Howse makes a similar claim when pointing out that the contemporary international lawyers have failed 
in rethinking IEL jurisprudence because they have been either unable or disinterested in taking seriously 
the new progressive scholarship in international economics (above n 3, at 188).  
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were carried out by a contextualised group of legal practitioners and intellectuals 
between the late 1940s and the early 1990s.83 Three consequences derive from 
understanding that the ‘origins’ and ‘progress’ of IEL were intertwined with the 
‘invention’, ‘maturation’, and ‘defence’ of the IEL expertise. First, the IEL field is 
regarded as not only a formal body of rules, institutions, and doctrines, but also a 
way of thinking and practicing those norms, regimes or techniques. It involves the 
production, transmission and maintenance of knowledge between lawyers so that 
ideas and methods are routinely embedded ceasing to be politically or intellectually 
contested. In particular, the mainstream understanding of the IEL field’s history 
and boundaries reflect emblematically the continuous labour of contemporary 
lawyers to encapsulate a specific set of political decisions, intellectual 
commitments, historical facts and normative positions into the conventional 
narratives.  
 Moreover, those historical accounts are regarded as carrying out central 
lessons that smooth the process of decision-making and consensus-building within 
the IEL expertise. These teachings are employed to ‘construct’ the IEL field 
having more or less influence depending on contingent factors related to the 
authority and legitimacy of their proponents and reasoning. In this sense, 
jurisprudential and institutional stories were neither neutral nor apolitical. Rather, 
they were produced by lawyers pursuing personal or collective projects, who are 
located in different jurisdictions, educated according to distinct legal traditions, 
and committed to divergent political groups and ideological mind-sets.84 The 
consequence of this view is to contest the field’s traditional claim to universalism 
and perpetuity of IEL, since it cannot be sustained empirically, but only aspired to 
intellectually.  
 Thus, I suggest that the making of IEL history should combine an analysis of 
the field’s intellectual history with an investigation of the performance of its 
members as designers, managers and interpreters of international economic law 
and governance. The purpose of an alternative approach is to investigate how 
inside disciplinary struggles and outside political-economic conflicts shape the 
                                                      
83 This approach to international law was inspired by the work of David Kennedy, Challenging Expert Rule: 
The Politics of Global Governance, 27 SYDNEY J. OF INT’L L. 3-12 (2005); David Kennedy, A WORLD OF 
STRUGGLE: HOW POWER, LAW, AND EXPERTISE SHAPE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (2016); Andrew 
Lang and Joanne Scott, The Hidden World of WTO Governance, 20 EUR. J. INT. LAW 575-614 (2009); Martti 
Koskenniemi, Between Commitment and Cynicism: Outline for a Theory of International Law as Practice, in THE 
POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011); Anthea Roberts, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL? 
(2017). 
84 To understand international economic law as a transnational field, it is imperative to be aware of two 
basic sorts of internal dynamics: the intellectual dynamic of commitment and aversion and the 
professional dynamic of affiliation and disaffiliation. The interplay of intellectual and political disputes 
tends to determine relations of differentiation, dominance and disruption both inside and outside the IEL 
field. More precisely, the IEL boundary expands and diminishes by the continuous process of decision-
making and consensus-building that underlies those group dynamics (Kennedy, above n 14, at 408-414; 
Roberts, above n 83, at 1-6). 
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construction, contestation and validation of historical narratives that constitute the 
contemporary understanding of the IEL field.85 
 
3. BREAKING UP WITH MODERNISM: IEL HISTORY AS TEMPORAL CONTESTATIONS 
OF DISCIPLINARY BOUNDARIES  
 
 My proposal is to depart from the Modernist commitment to a progressive, 
linear and universal style of IEL history that often instrumentalises institutional or 
jurisprudential stories to reassert disciplinary boundaries so as to support 
particular programmes.86 This means to resist our impulse born out of the 
traditional approach to constructing narratives of IEL rules, institutions and 
doctrines by working backwards in order to ‘uncover’ a single lineage that justifies 
the natural or logical teleology we want to see hidden in history. To do so, I 
suggest recalibrating three main elements of IEL history-telling: frame, scope and 
scale. 
 Following the shift from positive norms to differentiated expertise, the focus should 
not be on retelling how legal rules, regimes, ideas and techniques have 
continuously and progressively evolved over time into their contemporary 
manifestations. Rather, the aim is to foreground the ways in which legal norms 
and knowledge are produced by contextualised groups of lawyers who pursue their 
projects through practice. This does not mean imposing a dogmatic separation 
between past and present aiming to completely sterilise the IEL history from 
critical engagements. I suggest emphasising, instead of erasing, intellectual 
conflicts and political battles that historically produced compromises, ruptures or 
transformations within the normative, institutional, doctrinal dimensions of IEL. 
Therefore, a new approach enables us to better understand the means by which 
the field’s boundaries have constrained legal imagination by continually retelling 
the conventional narratives. In doing so, it would not only highlight the conditions 
of possibility that frame legal decision-making about and under IEL, but also 
                                                      
85 The IEL field is shaped by internal and external disputes over authority and resources. Within the 
discipline, there is the often-neglected interplay between domestic, national and transnational interactions 
among legal practitioners and academics. Lawyers pledges their allegiance to intellectual traditions, 
political groupings and normative programmes that are created and developed in contextualised settings. 
This implies that IEL ideas and practices are, in general, not universal or transnational per se, but rather 
nurtured in a particular place and then transferred to others. The importing-exporting dynamics can be 
seen as a form of ‘transnationalised localism’, which consists of a process by which a particular normative 
programme, jurisprudential project, or institutional vision succeeds in extending its reach over the IEL 
field and, by doing so, develops the capacity to designate a rival alternative as local. Not surprisingly, the 
acceptance and rejection of IEL projects, knowledge and techniques are deeply dependent on the relative 
geopolitical power of their production sites. As I discuss in this paper, theories, methods and doctrines 
developed in the United States have exerted far greater influence over the IEL expertise than the ones 
produced in France or African countries (Roberts, above n 83, at 8-9. See also Boaventura de Sousa 
Santos, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE: LAW, GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION 178-179 
(2002)). 
86 This strategy was inspired by Koskenniemi’s approach to history of international law (above n 65 and 
72). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3194660 
 
 
Rafael Lima Sakr          Beyond History and Boundaries 
 
 
 29 
empower a critical engagement with international lawyers’ past and present 
expertise and choices. 
 
4. DEPARTING FROM ANGLOCENTRISM: IEL HISTORY AS SPATIAL CONTESTATION 
OF DISCIPLINARY BOUNDARIES 
 
 This strategy consists of breaking up with Anglocentrism.87 If IEL is 
understood as a transnational field that aggregates lawyers from and working in 
multiple jurisdictions, historical narratives shall also be conceived as produced in 
sites located outside the Anglo-American world. This move entails two 
consequences. It is necessary to take into consideration that IEL has been thought 
and practiced in distinct contexts. Nonetheless, the validity and legitimacy of ideas 
and techniques hinge on the dynamic interplay between different legal 
communities within the IEL expertise. This disciplinary interaction is affected by 
the unequal distribution of authority and resources. Consequently, it is particularly 
important to be aware of the effects of certain ‘spatial’ differences over the 
production of approaches to legal history, as well as of the extent to which some 
of these styles of history-telling have come to dominate understandings of what 
counts or not as IEL in a way that can make them appear, or be presented as, 
neutral and universal.  
 Against this backdrop, I propose to move away from the traditional 
approach. Instead of equating IEL history with Anglo-American diplomatic and 
jurisprudential stories, the aim is to foreground the variety of historical narratives 
chronicled according to different approaches, each produced by the interplay of 
contextualised groups of international lawyers (within and across jurisdictions) 
facing political and intellectual communalities, dissimilarities and conflicts. Thus, I 
suggest that the interaction between the IEL history and boundaries would be 
different if lessons produced by lawyers situated in distinct states and regions and 
often associated with different communities were to be accepted as part of the 
IEL expertise rather than obfuscated by Anglocentrism. For instance, the 
European Paris, Brussels, Geneva, Moscow and Belgrade, the Mediterranean 
Algiers, Tunis, Rabat, and Cairo, the African Yaoundé, Lomé and Lagos, the Latin 
American Montevideo and Georgetown have been among the most relevant 
places where historical narratives have been constructed not only to shape the IEL 
expertise, but also to justify and legitimise ideas and practices to be used in making 
or interpreting legal norms, regimes and doctrines underlying global economic 
governance. 
 
                                                      
87 This strategy draws from the work of Koskenniemi (above n 65 and 72) and Orford (above n 73), who 
have historicised the ways in which Eurocentrism and Anglocentrism have shaped international law and 
international trade law, respectively. 
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5. TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW 
 
 All in all, my alternative approach to IEL history has three aspirations. It first 
intends to offer a way to rethink IEL history as a window to unveil how different 
groups of lawyers have participated in the foundation and development of 
international economic law. It aims to assist us in understanding how 
jurisprudential and institutional stories have been produced to govern the 
constitution, management and demarcation of the IEL expertise. In particular, it 
shall highlight the means in which these historical accounts have connected a 
‘certain’ past to a ‘certain’ present in order to establish and sustain relations of 
difference, dominance and disruption inside and outside the IEL domain. Thus, 
this new style of history-telling purports to reveal how lessons have been 
extensively employed to draw the field’s boundaries in ways that have affected 
international lawyers’ understanding of and engagement with IEL. 
 The second goal is to help lawyers to understand the ways in which IEL has 
been employed to control the formation, management and contestation of 
normative, institutional and jurisprudential projects operating within the 
international economic order. For instance, it aims to foreground the continuous 
involvement of lawyers in the entrenchment of (Liberal-welfarist88, Socialist89, 
Developmentalist90 and Neoliberal91) programmes into international economic 
                                                      
88 The so-called Liberal-welfarism is understood here to be the Anglo-American programme for a postwar 
international regime for economic cooperation aimed at striking a compromise between the aspiration for 
a multilateral system for trade, finance and monetary cooperation, on the one hand, and the call for 
national intervention on economic and social spaces, on the other (John G. Ruggie, International Regimes, 
Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism and the Post- war Economic Order, 36 INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION 393-398 (1982); Jouannet, above n 75, at 249-253).  
89 The so-called Socialism is defined here as a normative programme created and developed by Socialist 
countries in the context of the COMECON. It reflected a balanced compromise between the comradely 
aspiration for a multilateral regime devised to achieve formal and substantive equality among states 
through the implementation of “the international socialist division of labour in the interest of building 
socialism and communism in their countries,” on the one hand; and, the voluntary desire to protect 
national sovereignty as the means for avoiding foreign interference in the state control of centrally 
planned domestic economies, on the other hand (Ustor, above n 80, at 183-1845, 275; Schiavone, above 
n 80, at 3-8).  
90 The so-called Developmentalism is conceived here as the Third-World programme led by the UNCTAD 
for an international regime for economic cooperation between developed and developing countries. The 
aim was at striking a compromise between two goals: on the one hand, the request for establishing a 
multilateral system for fairer, though dependent, economic cooperation; and, on the other hand, the 
desire for emancipatory intervention to foster economic development. This compromise between 
economic preference at international level and development interventionism at domestic level is at the 
core of the Developmentalist programme (Bedjaoui, above n 81, at 188-189, 250-253; Abi-Saab, above n 
81, at 102-104; Elias, above n 81, at 39-40, 208-209). 
91 The so-called Neoliberalism is understood here as a normative programme developed as a reaction to the 
economic turmoil of the 1970s, which contributed to erode the political and intellectual support for the 
Liberal-welfarism. It differs from the previous programme for several reasons, but two are central. First, 
it shifts the Liberal-welfarist compromise towards economic liberalism on both international and 
domestic levels. Second, it reimagines the world economy as a global market whose production and 
welfare potential are to be realised through ‘deep’ liberalisation (Lang, above n 75, at Part II; Orford, 
above n 73, at 709-710; Howse, above n 17). 
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law. In particular, the purpose is to unveil how legal and non-legal experts 
collaborate to embody those projects into legal rules, institutions and doctrines, 
through ritualised processes of law-making and interpretation. With this in mind, a 
new approach aspires to historicise how legal ideas and techniques have been 
reworked through continuous practice in order to create and sustain normative, 
institutional and jurisprudential programmes, which have in turn provided the 
underlying vocabulary and the boundaries around what today we call the IEL field.  
 The third aspiration is to contribute to debates on contemporary issues of 
international economic law by rethinking the history of the present. Understanding 
IEL history as part of today’s practice involves revealing how the work of 
embedding programmes through historical narratives has shaped the field’s 
identity, mission and influence in global economic governance. Nowadays, it is 
common-sense to argue that IEL is somehow losing its effectiveness or perhaps 
heading towards a critical moment. The reasons lie partially in doubts about the 
limits of the Neoliberal project itself, and partially in fears about the capacity of 
IEL, as expertise and mode of governance, to provide solutions to present-day 
problems. In providing a new way of understanding the interaction between 
history and boundaries, an alternative approach aims at penetrating into the field 
so as to illuminate how it has constituted and moulded the conditions of 
possibility that enable and constrain lawyers to conceive and practice IEL in their 
engagement with the contemporary challenges to global economic governance.92  
 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
I opened this article by suggesting that the interaction between history and 
boundary is key to understanding the participation of international lawyers in the 
construction, operation and contestation of international regimes for regulating 
trade, monetary and financial affairs. Throughout the article, I have demonstrated 
that the IEL boundaries result from the interplay between intellectual debates 
meaningfully grounded in history lessons and the political disputes arising out of 
collective and individual pursuits of authority and legitimacy. In this context, the 
function of the traditional style of history-telling is two-fold. It narrates the past as 
teachings to support normative, jurisprudential and institutional projects for 
governing the world economy. It chronicles the past as lessons to conceive, frame, 
                                                      
92 Howse makes a similar argument when pointing out that the contemporary international lawyers have 
failed in rethinking IEL jurisprudence because they have been either unable or disinterested in taking 
seriously the new progressive scholarship in international economics led by Thomas Piketty, Dani Rodrik, 
Joseph Stiglitz and Jeffrey Sachs (above n 3, at 188). However, Howse might not have gone far or deep 
enough, to the extent that his “allies” are all economists situated at leading universities in the Anglo-
American world. There are also other non-legal experts whose cutting-edge work has been continuously 
overlooked or marginalised by the IEL field, such as Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, Ha-Joon Chang, 
Mushtaq Khan, and John Ravenhill. 
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argue and solve international economic problems through law. This means that 
the traditional approach has great responsibility for producing the conditions of 
possibility that empower and constrain lawyers’ imaginative interaction with global 
economic governance. More specifically, I claim that this approach has excessively 
limited the IEL imagination preventing legal thinkers and practitioners from 
offering inventive solutions to dealing with the contemporary issues.  
 Furthermore, the upheavals within the Western developed countries (mainly 
caused by the Trump Administration and the Brexit negotiations) and the rise of 
China are reshaping international economic law and governance. It is reasonable 
to assume that these challenges will not vanish by themselves or wait for the IEL 
expertise to move beyond the consensus around the traditional approach. It is also 
expected that, if lawyers fail in participating in the construction of innovative 
proposals or alternatives, other experts and policymakers will fill in the gap. The 
consequence of inadequate or unsatisfactory engagement might cause the 
marginalisation of the IEL expertise within the global economic governance and 
the disruption of its core features.  
 If my analysis is correct, the IEL field should seek to relax its disciplinary 
frontiers in order to produce alternative ways to reform and transform the 
international economic order. This would include welcoming innovative projects, 
new ideas and inventive techniques from legal and non-legal experts located 
outside Anglo-American, orthodox sites. In addition, the IEL expertise should 
rethink its own history in order to recover the sense it once had that the field was 
characterised by normative heterogeneity, institutional experimentalism and 
jurisprudential innovation. I hope that the proposed alternative approach will 
assist in broadening the IEL boundaries so as to lessen the disciplinary constraints 
while empowering lawyers to re-imagine IEL in response to the contemporary 
challenges. Therefore, I want to conclude by offering some research avenues 
through which this new approach can expand our comprehension of history and 
boundary interaction. 
 First, I have suggested that the IEL field is critical in shaping the role of 
international economic law and lawyers in global economic governance. It is 
directly implicated in the ways legal practitioners and thinkers cope with the 
contemporary issues. Indeed, its influence is chiefly experienced through the 
control over the production and transmission of understandings, meanings, and 
knowledge related to the world economy. Boundary-drawing and history-telling 
function as modes of expert governance, constituted by political and intellectual 
dynamics, that determine the authority and legitimacy of who and what matter or 
not for IEL. In doing so, the IEL expertise structures the means and governs the 
range of choices that can be made as to whether certain norms, actors, ideas and 
projects are (part of) IEL. Studying the IEL field as practices of disciplinary 
differentiation, domination and disruption is thus studying the conditions of 
possibility sustained by the IEL expertise for lawyers to engage in new or 
alternative ways to reform and transform global economic law and governance. 
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 Through the analyses of the scholarly work of Robert Howse and Steve 
Charnovitz, I demonstrated that the pervasive use of the traditional style serves to 
instrumentalise history in support of boundaries. The link between the 
conventional narratives and the field’s mission and identity is constructed and 
justified through views of the world economy’s telos. This approach enables legal 
reasoning to work backwards in order to ‘discover’ history lessons accounting for 
a single lineage that validates and legitimises the natural or logical teleology 
embedded into legal norms, regimes and doctrines governing international 
economic relations. More concretely, past events are often selected and articulated 
by international lawyers, according to the Neoliberal programme, into storylines 
that provide institutional and jurisprudential teachings. Thus, a promising research 
avenue is to foreground the role of the traditional approach in the construction of 
lessons for evidencing the universal connection between the origins, development, 
purpose, content, and form of international economic law rules and institutions. 
In doing so, it opens the possibility of shedding light to a critical but often-
neglected function of the traditional approach, the use of history by (or as) 
disciplinary demarcation between IEL and ‘the others’. The definition of the others 
relies upon the spatial and temporal dedifferentiation carried out by the IEL 
expertise. This includes drawing a line between IEL and other branches of 
international law and other expert domains of international economic 
policymaking, as well as between norms, regimes, ideas and methods that are part 
of the present or the past of IEL. 
 Grounded in a new trend in international law literature, I have criticised the 
traditional approach to IEL history for its ontological and epistemological 
limitations. I have suggested that the Modernism and Anglocentrism embedded in 
the traditional style appear to constrain rather than empower international lawyers 
to rework the IEL expertise in order to provide new and alternative responses to 
the current issues. In particular, these disciplinary commitments seem to have 
adversely impacted the IEL domain in two ways. At the intellectual level, they 
have narrowed the broad understanding the field once had of its origins and 
development. The consequence is that history lessons have been produced to 
vindicate the naturalness, necessity or superiority of a specific set of legal norms, 
regimes, ideas and techniques. At the professional level, those commitments have 
shaped the field’s core elements, narrowing what and who do or do not count as 
(part of) international economic law. Therefore, the third line of scholarly inquiry 
is to unveil the constraining and empowering effects produced by the traditional 
approach over the IEL field through the teleological construction and 
maintenance of disciplinary boundaries. 
 In an attempt to address or avoid some of those shortcomings inherent to the 
traditional approach, the fourth strategy is to resituate the foundation and 
development of international economic law within a wider temporal trajectory and 
special context. The aim is to cause history-telling to take into consideration not 
only the ‘rest’ of international law but also the ‘other’ international economic 
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policymaking domains and institutionalised regimes of economic governance 
existing between 1944 and 1994. More specifically, history lessons should be 
learned not as the outcome of a unilateral process of normative or institutional 
specialisation or fragmentation, which is possible to be ‘discovered’. Instead, they 
should be conceived as part of the inside disciplinary struggles and outside 
political-economic conflicts underscoring the ‘invention’, ‘maturation’, and 
‘defence’ of the IEL field itself.  
 Furthermore, I propose to retell the IEL history as single, universal, and 
neutral accounts of past events, but rather as contingent and partial stories 
carrying out normative programmes, institutional visions and jurisprudential 
projects. The alternative style of history-telling has the potential to uncover the 
moral and material roots of Modernism and Anglocentrism that are entrenched in 
the mainstream literature. Morally, the Anglo-American view of international 
economic law as an instrument for realising a specific (initially, Liberal-welfarist 
and, now, Neoliberalist) agenda has been tied up with the Modernist idea of 
universal and linear evolution. The result has been the development of 
institutional and jurisprudential stories to legitimise the field’s contemporary 
identity and mission, by demonstrating that its origins and development go back to 
past events that are central for Neoliberalism and Anglo-American diplomacy. 
Materially, the dominance of Modernism and Anglocentrism has a great deal to do 
with the political and economic power of the United States and the United 
Kingdom in shaping international economic law and governance since the postwar 
period, but, especially, after the Cold War. Hence, this research avenue aims to use 
the alternative approach to provide a better map of the conditions of possibility 
that frame legal decision-making about and under IEL, and so critically engage in a 
dialogue with lawyers’ past and present expertise and choices. 
 
